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Abstract
This paper empirically decomposes the costs of welfare participation using a model of
labor supply and participation in multiple welfare programs. Prior estimates of the cost
of welfare participation have not diﬀerentiated psychological costs, or stigma, from the
eﬀort required to become eligible and maintain eligibility (time costs). The relative
size of these two costs has implications for policy. We ﬁnd that psychological costs
are at least as large as the time costs associated with participation in food assistance
programs. In addition, we ﬁnd that the incidence of psychological costs is inconsistent
with these costs acting as an eﬀective screening mechanism.
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A substantial fraction of households that are eligible for welfare, or public assistance, do not
participate. Across program, most estimates of welfare take-up rates for the U.S. range from
40 to 80 percent (Hernanz, Malherbet, and Pellizzari 2004). By refusing to collect welfare
beneﬁts, households are foregoing consumption and thus appear to violate a primary tenet
of microeconomic theory, that higher consumption yields higher utility. The decision to turn
down welfare beneﬁts, however, is economically justiﬁable if there is a cost associated with
participation.
While other social science disciplines developed the idea of participation imposing a
psychological cost, Moﬃtt (1983) is the ﬁrst to explicitly introduce “welfare stigma” – the
disutility incurred from participating in welfare – into an economic model. He found evidence
for a sizable utility cost from participation and his work initiated a stream of literature
concerned with measuring the eﬀect of stigma on participation. One approach has been to
estimate the eﬀect of observable characteristics, which researchers argue are associated with
welfare stigma, on the probability of participation using a latent index model (Blundell, Fry,
and Walker 1988; Riphahn 2001), while others have used experimental approaches (Daponte,
Sanders, and Taylor 1999) or dynamic approaches (Blank and Ruggles 1996). Using a
structural model of labor supply and welfare participation, Moﬃtt (1983) and Keane and
Moﬃtt (1998) have modeled the costs associated with participation as an all-encompassing
welfare stigma term and have been successful at quantifying the total utility cost due to
participation. Fang and Silverman (2004) used a dynamic structural model to show that
non-participation could be explained by a one-time welfare stigma cost at ﬁrst use rather
than a reoccurring cost during each period of participation.
In this paper we extend this prior work by decomposing the utility cost of welfare par-
ticipation into the psychological cost of participating and the time and eﬀort required to
maintain eligibility (time costs). Estimating the combined utility cost of participation, as in
2Moﬃtt (1983), informs policy-makers about the net value of welfare beneﬁts. However, being
able to distinguish what fraction of this utility cost is attributable to the opportunity costs
associated with complying with participation requirements relative to psychological costs
conveys important additional information that could have policy implications. For example,
if the utility costs of participation are primarily due to time costs, such as paperwork and
visits to welfare program oﬃces, policies with the goal of increasing take-up rates among eli-
gibles could focus on streamlining the application and re-certiﬁcation process. Prior research
has found these processes to be costly and burdensome, as evidenced by higher exit rates in
the last month of the eligibility period (Grobe, Weber, and Davis 2008) and by surveys of
individuals who have exited welfare (Brauner and Zedlewski 1999).
If the utility costs of participation are primarily due to psychological costs, however,
then take-up rates could be increased by reducing the visibility of welfare participation, such
as by using refundable credits in the federal income tax code like the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC).1 Studies in the sociology and public health literatures show that participants
in welfare programs report lower self-image as well as negative treatment by neighbors,
peers, and program administrators. These psychological costs may be lowered by making
participation less visible because research has found that negative stereotypes are often
transmitted through “stigma symbols,” such as food stamp coupons and Medicaid cards
(Rosier and Corasaro 1993; Barr 2000; and Stuber and Schlesinger 2006). Alternatively, a
policy initiative that promoted these programs as entitlements rather than welfare would
decrease psychological costs while preserving the in-kind nature of transfer programs.2 In
addition, as an ordeal mechanism to make welfare participation less attractive to able-bodied
individuals, time costs and psychological costs are not likely to be equally useful. Separating
1This assumes that psychological costs are signiﬁcantly lower for income received through the tax system
than through welfare programs. This is sensible due to the low visibility and the widespread usage of tax
credits and deductions. Hotz and Scholz (2003) estimate that EITC participation among eligibles in 1996
was as high as 87.2 percent, which is substantially higher than take-up rates in most welfare programs.
2See Currie and Gahvari (2008) for a review of the theoretical arguments for in-kind transfers and the
varying empirical support for the proposed theories.
3time costs from psychological costs in the estimation allows for more informed public policy
discussion.
We develop a static model of program participation and labor supply that allows for the
separate estimation of psychological and time costs associated with welfare participation.
We model participation in two welfare programs: the Food Stamp Program (FSP) and
the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). For
identiﬁcation, we assume that the psychological cost associated with participation does not
increase with the number of programs in which the individual participates. Time costs,
however, are speciﬁc to the program and thus accrue according to the set of programs in
which the individual participates because WIC and FSP beneﬁts are distributed at diﬀerent
oﬃces and redemption requires two separate transactions. Our static model, similar to Keane
and Moﬃtt (1998), does not allow for the diﬀerentiation of long-term eligible and short-term
eligible households as in the dynamic model of Fang and Silverman (2004). While this
advantage of a dynamic model is appealing, it increases the complexity and potentially
distracts from the identiﬁcation of psychological and time costs.
The identiﬁcation assumption implies that there are no additional psychological costs
from participating in WIC if one is already a FSP participant and vice versa. Our spe-
ciﬁc application to FSP and WIC makes our identifying assumption tenable because both
programs provide similar in-kind beneﬁts redeemed at a grocery store. This assumption
would not necessarily hold for other welfare programs. While it is not possible to test this
assumption directly, we show evidence consistent with this assumption by showing that FSP
participation is aﬀected by discontinuities in WIC beneﬁts.
Using a simulated estimation method, we ﬁnd that, psychological costs are important.
We calculate the amount of consumption (in dollars) that would be needed to oﬀset the util-
ity loss caused by psychological cost of participating in welfare. On average the psychological
cost of participating in a food assistance program is about $19 per week. We estimate that
the time cost of participation in the FSP is about 0.5 hours per week ($4 in consumption
4equivalent) and that the time cost is about 3.1 hours per week ($21 in consumption equiva-
lent) for WIC. For a FSP participant, the psychological costs are much larger than the time
costs. For a WIC participant the psychological and time costs are similar in magnitude. Of
course, there is considerable heterogeneity in the psychological costs; the standard deviation
is nearly $30 in consumption equivalent per week.
In Moﬃtt’s (1983) seminal work, he recognizes that his utility cost estimate includes other
factors besides psychological and time costs, such as lack of information about a program,
which can be interpreted as the costs of acquiring information about welfare. We do not
explicitly model knowledge of welfare programs or the cost of acquiring this information.
We argue that knowledge of these welfare program is very high among the individuals in our
data (single women). However, because information is not modeled explicitly, the structural
assumptions of our model have implications for where information costs are absorbed in
the estimation. If one assumes that individuals lack information about the existence of
food assistance programs, then our estimate of the psychological costs includes the costs
of acquiring this information. If however, the role of information is program speciﬁc and
surrounds the details of beneﬁts and eligibility, then this information cost is part of the time
costs associated with each program. Information costs are likely absorbed into the time costs
(biasing them upward) because it is unlikely that many of the individuals in the data are
unaware of the existence of these food assistance programs given their thirty-year history.
While the primary goal of this paper is to quantify the relative size of time costs and
psychological costs for individuals, social welfare is not necessarily reduced one-for-one with
these costs. In particular, these costs may discourage able individuals from substituting
government assistance for work. If these costs play a screening role and the ensuing sepa-
rating equilibrium is socially desirable, then the individual-level utility reductions overstate
the impact of these costs on social welfare. This paper outlines a simple screening model
to illustrate this idea and we use our empirical results to test this model. We ﬁnd a strong
negative correlation between the psychological cost of welfare program participation and the
5preference for leisure, which suggests that the incidence of psychological costs is inconsistent
with these costs acting as an eﬀective screening mechanism.
The economic model of welfare program participation and labor supply is outlined in
Section 2. Section 3 describes the beneﬁts and eligibility rules of the two welfare programs
used in this study, FSP and WIC, as well as the data used for the analysis. Section 4 gives
the econometric and functional form speciﬁcation and the method of estimation is discussed
in Section 5. Section 6 provides the results from the simulated estimation and quantiﬁes the
magnitude of the utility costs. We extend the primary empirical analysis in Section 7 with a
model in which welfare stigma acts as a screening mechanism. Section 8 concludes the paper
and outlines areas for future research.
2 Model
We present a static model of labor supply and welfare program participation in a utility
maximizing framework. The individual jointly decides how many hours to work in the labor
market and whether or not to participate in welfare (one program or multiple programs).
Individual i’s utility is given by
Ui = U (Li , Ci) − Φi (1)
where Li is leisure, Ci is consumption, and Φi is the psychological disutility from welfare
program participation. The psychological cost, Φi, is a ﬂat cost that does not depend on the
amount of beneﬁts received. This was one of the main ﬁndings from Moﬃtt (1983) and is
consistent with the ﬁnding that households value food beneﬁts similarly to cash (Smeeding,
1982).3 In addition, we allow the psychological cost to be person-speciﬁc, which is consistent
3Moﬃtt (1983) tested whether the utility cost of welfare participation (i.e., “welfare stigma”) entered the
utility function as a ﬂat cost, a variable cost, or both. A ﬂat cost implies a threshold, given by the level of
stigma, which beneﬁts must exceed if the individual is to participate. A variable cost means that the value
of income received from welfare programs is less than that from private sources of income. Empirically, a ﬂat
6with ﬁndings in the sociology literature that stigma depends on the individual’s life history
and their social network (Rogers-Dillon 1995).
Because there is no household production in the model, leisure is the time remaining
after completing market work and fulﬁlling the program-speciﬁc welfare participation re-
quirements:




Individual i has a time endowment of T and works Hi hours a week for pay. Participation in
welfare program k is indicated by Pki = 1, while non-participation is indicated by Pki = 0.
The time required to fulﬁll participation requirements for welfare program k is given by
δk, which captures time-intensive activities such as ﬁlling out forms, waiting in line, and
traveling to and from the welfare oﬃce. This cost also captures any marginal cost associated
with participation including monetary costs such as transportation costs.
Consumption is the sum of after-tax income (labor and non-labor) and welfare beneﬁts:




The wage is given by wi and non-labor income is given by Ni. The tax function, τi, depends on
i’s family characteristics, for example, the number of dependents. It maps income (labor and
non-labor) into tax liability. The value of welfare beneﬁts from participating in program k is
Bki where the value of welfare beneﬁts may depend on family characteristics. The incentives
created by welfare programs may inﬂuence family structure itself; however, studies ﬁnd that
the estimated impact is small in magnitude (Moﬃtt 1992). We assume that marital status,
number of children, and living arrangement are exogenous and do not depend on beneﬁt
levels.
cost implies that take-up rates would increase if welfare beneﬁts were to become more generous; a variable
cost alone would not have this implication. Using data on participation in Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) by single females from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), Moﬃtt (1983) only
ﬁnds evidence of a ﬂat utility cost.







k=1 Pki > 0
0 if
 K
k=1 Pki = 0
(4)
where Pki ∈ {0,1}. The individual bears psychological cost φi if she participates in any
welfare program (i.e. lowered self-image as a result of relying on the government for support).
This psychological cost is due to being a welfare recipient and is the same regardless of the
number of welfare programs in which she participates. This assumption is the primary source
of identiﬁcation.
The level of welfare beneﬁts, Bki, that an individual would receive if she were to partici-
pate in program k is given by the function bk which maps household characteristics (Zi) and
income into welfare beneﬁts:
Bki = bk (wiHi,Ni,Zi). (5)
Participation in a welfare program k is subject to eligibility constraints on income, assets,
and household characteristics. Because welfare participation is a binary decision, the indi-
vidual faces 2K possible participation combinations, where K is the total number of welfare
programs. The individual selects welfare participation and hours to maximize (1) subject to
(2) through (5).
This structural model allows for a more accurate characterization of welfare program
eligibility than is commonly used. In the model, welfare program participation decisions
are made jointly with labor supply decisions. Therefore, most households are potentially
eligible to participate in welfare programs; however, actual eligibility depends on the labor
supply decision.Eligibility for WIC depends primarily on the presence of children in the
household. Children are taken as exogenous, so households without children are not eligible
regardless of the chosen labor supply. For example, a household with observed earnings
8greater than the eligibility cutoﬀ could have received beneﬁts by choosing to earn less. This
model seeks to explain not only why eligible households choose not to participate, but also
why other households choose to earn more than the eligibility cutoﬀ and thus preclude welfare
participation. The eligibility requirements are explained in Section 3.1.
3 Welfare Program Characteristics and Data
We restrict our analysis to two U.S. welfare programs, the Food Stamp Program (FSP) and
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC).4 These
food and nutrition welfare programs are federally ﬁnanced and approximately uniform across
states; both have been in existence since the early 1970s. In addition, we use these two
programs because the non-additivity assumption on psychological costs is most defensible
because beneﬁts from both programs are redeemed at a grocery store. The assumption for
additive time costs is also valid because programs are operated out of diﬀerent oﬃces and
beneﬁts must be redeemed separately.5 In contrast to AFDC and TANF, most rules for FSP
and WIC are set at the federal level, which limits the role of measurement error in imputing
program rules, and also avoids the potential problem of state speciﬁc time limits that were
imposed on TANF as a part of Welfare Reform in 1996 .6 Trippe and Doyle (1992) ﬁnd that
approximately 50 percent of households eligible for food stamps do not participate in the
program, while Kim (1998) estimate that only 32 percent of eligible families participate in
food stamps among the working poor.7 Throughout this paper, WIC is indicated by k = 1
and FSP is indicated by k = 2.
4As of October 1, 2008 the federal Food Stamp Program received a new name: Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP), to reﬂect recent changes in the program that promote nutrition and healthy
eating among low income individuals.
5At the grocery counter, WIC items must be separated from items purchased using Food Stamps.
6Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) replaced AFCD with the passage of Welfare Reform Act in
1996, also known as 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).
7Trippe and Doyle (1992) use the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1976 to 1990. While the mean
is about 50 percent, there was some variation in take-up rates over the period.
93.1 Beneﬁt Calculation and Eligibility Requirements
The eligibility requirements and beneﬁt formula used in this paper closely approximate the
national eligibility standards for both programs. WIC was established in 1972 as a program
to provide nutritional support to women who are pregnant or breast-feeding and to children
under age ﬁve. WIC provides paper coupons that specify exactly what and how much food
can be purchased.8 These food items include infant formula, juice, milk, cereal, and protein-
rich foods (such as peanut butter and beans). In addition to the restriction on household
demographics, a family is eligible for WIC beneﬁts if its income is less than 185 percent of
the federal poverty level. The program also stipulates that individuals need to be at risk in
terms of nutritional status. In practice, however, women and children who meet the income
requirement are deemed eligible for WIC beneﬁts because nutritional risk is broadly deﬁned
in that low-income children are classiﬁed as being nutritionally at risk (Currie 2003).
For eligible families, WIC beneﬁts do not decrease with income. Beneﬁts depend on the





0 if i has no children < age 5 and is not pregnant
¯ B1i if wiHi + Ni ≤ 1.85(povertyi) and {children < age 5 or is pregnant}
(6)
where ¯ B1i is the dollar value of the food items qualiﬁed for based on family characteristics.
Beneﬁts are equal to zero if there are no children under age ﬁve and the woman is not
pregnant or if income exceeds 185 percent of the poverty threshold for that family size.
Unlike FSP, WIC beneﬁts are speciﬁed in quantities of food, not as a dollar value. For
this analysis, we convert the food items into dollar amounts using inﬂation-adjusted prices
of these goods. The food items covered by WIC depend on family characteristics, hence
the value of beneﬁts depends on the family’s composition. Table 1 shows the value to the
8Currently, some states are adopting EBT systems for WIC. As of March 2008, only New Mexico and
Wyoming had adopted statewide EBT system for WIC; eleven states are currently piloting the program
(source: http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/EBT/wicebtstatus.htm).
10family by age of child in 1997 dollars. Prices were computed using 2006 prices per ounce of
food product and deﬂated using the CPI-U. Prices per ounce were selected from large-size
packages to use the lowest available price to err on the side of undervaluing the beneﬁts to
avoid overestimating the role of psychological and time costs in the participation decision.
Eligibility for FSP requires satisfying two income tests: 1) gross income test, or that
income cannot exceed 130 percent of the poverty threshold for that family size; and 2) net
income test, or that gross income less 20 percent of earned income and child care costs (set to
be $125 per child under age 5), cannot exceed the poverty threshold.9 We approximate the
third eligibility requirement for FSP, the asset test, by assuming that those individuals with
liquid assets in excess of $5000 are not eligible.10 We select an asset cutoﬀ above the actual
FSP level of $2000 (or $3000 for families with an elderly individual) because in practice,
recipients often “spend down” their assets or hide them in order to meet the asset threshold.
In this paper, FSP beneﬁts, B2i, are given by:
B2i = ¯ B2i − 0.3(0.8wi Hi + Ni − 125 childreni) (7)
where childreni is the number of children under age ﬁve in the household. The maximum
beneﬁt level, ¯ B2i, depends on the number of persons in the family. FSP beneﬁts are reduced
at a rate of 30 percent for each additional dollar of net income (including transfers from
AFDC or TANF).11
Historically, FSP distributed coupons that could be used to purchase any food item at
participating stores, excluding alcohol, tobacco, and some prepared foods. In 1993, Maryland
instituted an electronic beneﬁt transfer (EBT) system to modernize the process. A mandate
9Actual eligibility includes a deduction for excess housing costs and opportunities for larger child care
deductions; however, since we do not observe these expenditures we err in the direction of under-predicting
beneﬁts to avoid over-predicting psychological and time costs.
10Assets are deﬁned as liquid if they are held in checking or interest-earning accounts. Assets held in
stocks or bonds are not subject to this asset limit because, if these assets are held in pension accounts, they
would not be counted against the asset limits by the Food Stamp Program oﬃce.
11While not explicit in equation 7, earned income includes all labor income in the household.
11was passed in 1996 which required all states to adopt EBT by 2002. The adoption of EBT
was slow; by 2000, only twenty states had initiated pilot programs. This paper analyzes
participation in the fall of 1997, which is well before the full adoption of EBT. Future work
could compare estimates of psychological costs and time costs before and after the adoption
of the electronic system, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.2 Data
The data used for the study is a sample of female household heads from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation, 1996 (SIPP96).12 Our sample consists of non-married women
of working age who are in households where they are the sole decision-maker. Households
with multiple agents of working age were eliminated to alleviate concerns about joint labor
supply decisions within a household, leaving us with 5,541 heads of household, representing
approximately 17 million women.13
The selected sample represents a large fraction of welfare participants. In 1997, 60
percent of households that participated in food stamps and 40 percent of households that
participated in WIC had an unmarried female household head. In the same year, 44 percent
of households that participated in FSP and 28 percent of households that participated in
WIC also satisﬁed the single-decision maker restriction. While the selected sample does not
represent the full welfare-eligible population, it does represent a substantial part of that
population.
12Recent research on survey measures of participation has found that the SIPP is less prone to underre-
porting bias relative to other large-scale surveys, such as the Current Population Survey (Meyer and Sullivan
2008).
13Within our sample, determining who is the head of household is usually straightforward because we
have eliminated households with multiple working adults, the exception being if these adults are children
still living at home. For more ambiguous family arrangements, the assignment of household head status is
based on earned income, age, whether the women is a mother, and who owns the welfare beneﬁts (when
applicable). We only include households consisting of individuals or families; we did not allow for unrelated
secondary individuals or subfamilies (as classiﬁed in SIPP). Because we limit our sample to households with
a single decision-maker and do not include households with unrelated individuals, our households closely
correspond to a food stamp unit.
12We analyze data from the fall of 1997, which was before the transition to state-determined
welfare was complete to limit confusion regarding time limits by the eligible population due
to the Welfare Reform Act of 1996.14 The family composition was deﬁned as of September
1997, with pregnancy imputed using later waves of the SIPP96. Participation in FSP and
WIC was taken from two months, September and October, to allow for a longer time window
to observe participation. This means that a family is considered a participant if any member
participated in FSP or WIC during either of these two months.
The descriptive statistics for the sample are given in Table 2 and were computed using
sample weights. After restricting the sample to women household heads of working age (18
to 64), the average age of these women is about 41 years old. Roughly one-third of these
women are of minority status. Over 35 percent have a post-secondary degree and 28 percent
have only a high school diploma; the average years of schooling is 13.5. Most of these women
live in an urban area and roughly one-third live in Southern states. Nearly 40 percent have
children under the age of 18 living with them and approximately 14 percent have a child
young enough to meet the eligibility requirement of WIC (under age 5).
The lower panel of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for income, assets, and hours
worked. Non-labor income includes the earned income from other members in the family as
well as interest income, property income, and government transfers. The distribution of the
value of liquid assets, which is used in the FSP eligibility test for assets, is highly skewed:
the mean value is $3760, while the median is $232. In addition, less than 13 percent of
households fail the asset test. Three-fourths of these women had positive weekly hours at
some point over the four month window (July 1997 to October 1997) and the average weekly
hours was just over 30. For those with zero hours of market work from July to October, we
impute their hourly wage; the procedure is described in Section 4.
Table 3 displays the participation rates and beneﬁt values for FSP and WIC. Not con-
trolling for eligibility, nearly six percent of the sample participates in WIC and 16 percent
14We also selected this wave due to availability of asset information in the topical module.
13participates in FSP; four percent of women participate in both programs. Of those women
who meet the WIC requirement based on the ages of children in the household (under age
5), 38 percent participate in WIC. For WIC, participation rates by child’s age allow for a
comparison to the rates reported by Currie (2003). Table 3 reports that participation rates
in WIC are highest for households with an infant (67 percent) and drop substantially for
those with children between ages one and ﬁve (36 percent); these numbers correspond closely
to Currie’s ﬁnding of 73 percent and 38 percent, respectively.
Returning to Table 3, the bottom panel reports summary statistics for the maximum
welfare beneﬁts. Maximum monthly beneﬁts for FSP were computed using family size and
state of residence and are equal to the value of beneﬁts at zero dollars of net income. The
value of WIC beneﬁts was computed based on the price of the bundle of goods covered for
each family member (see Table 1). This maximum beneﬁt value, and not the observed level
of beneﬁts, is relevant to the model because it gives the information necessary to determine
what the beneﬁt level would be for any potential labor supply decision. To control for how
“acceptable” participation in welfare is in an individual’s environment, we collect information
on AFDC take-up rates by the women’s state of residence. The rate is the ratio of total
AFDC caseloads divided by number of persons in poverty in 1996 by state; the mean rate is
34 percent. If this rate is capturing the social acceptance of welfare participation at a local
level, we expect psychological costs will be decreasing in this measure of the AFDC take-up
rate.
4 Econometric and Functional Form Speciﬁcation
Several reduced-form analysis of welfare participation provide insight into which factors
might be associated with the psychological cost of participating in welfare. Blundell, Fry
and Walker (1988) ﬁnd that education and the age of children in the household aﬀect the
probability of participation in the U.K. Standard Housing Beneﬁt. Ripahn (2001) ﬁnds that
14participation rates in the German social insurance program are higher for single-parents, for
parents with children under the age of seven, and for those living in cities with higher poverty
levels. She interprets these ﬁndings as indicating that stigma is lower for families with these
characteristics. Like Blundell, Fry, and Walker (1988), she ﬁnds that the probability of
participation decreases in education attainment. Our analysis incorporates some of these
characteristics in the estimation of psychological costs.
The psychological cost incurred by an individual from participating in either or both
welfare programs, φi, is given by
φi = Xi β + ξ AFDCratei + ǫi (8)
where Xi is a vector of observed characteristics for individual i and ǫi is an error term
that accounts for heterogeneity in psychological costs across individuals. The AFDCratei
variable is the state-level AFDC participation rate and its inclusion is a rough measure of
local attitudes toward welfare use. We would prefer to have a ﬁner geographical measure of
the attitude toward welfare use, but this was unavailable. The vector Xi includes measures
of education, children, age, race, region, urban/rural, as well as an indicator for participation
in AFDC by the individual. This indicator for AFDC participation is important because the
AFDC program participation decision is not modeled explicitly. AFDC participants have
already incured the psychological cost, so including this term in equation 8 allows for an
appropriate reduction in φi.
The other source of heterogeneity in the model is over preference for leisure, or distaste
for work. The leisure parameter in the utility function is stochastic and given by:
Γi = Xiγ + ηi. (9)
where Xi is the the same vector as in equation 8 and ηi is an error term that accounts for
15heterogeneity in preference for leisure, such that higher values of ηi correspond to higher
preference for leisure. The two error terms each have zero mean and are jointly normally
distributed with a correlation of ρǫη.




α + (1 − Γi)(Ci)
α  1
α − Φi. (10)
The parameter α dictates the degree of substitutability between leisure and consumption.
The parameter Γi indicates the preference for leisure with a larger value of Γi implying a
stronger preference for leisure.
Estimating the model requires a wage, wi, for each household. However, about one
quarter of women in this data are not employed and thus do not have an observable wage.
We predict a wage for these women using a Heckman selection procedure similar to Keane
and Moﬃtt (1998). Table 4 shows the estimates from the log wage equation and selection
equation assuming a joint normal distribution. Earnings and hours data were averaged over
four months, July through October, in order to smooth over shocks and give a more accurate
measure of labor supply.
The estimates correspond to those typically found in the literature: wage is concave in
age, increasing in education, higher for women who live in urban areas, and lower for women
who identify themselves as black, Hispanic, or Native American relative to white (excluded
group) and for those living in southern states. The mean predicted wage for those with
positive hours is $11.79 per hour. The mean predicted wage of those who are not employed
is $9.48, over two dollars less than those with positive hours of market work. The wage wi
is modeled to includes an error term to account for measurement or prediction error in the
wage:
wi = predicted wagei + νi. (11)
16The error term, ν, is assumed to be jointly normally distributed with ǫ and η with the
correlations given by ρνǫ and ρνη.
We estimate the utility function parameters, time cost parameters, the parameters of the
psychological cost equation, and the parameters of the preference for leisure equation, as
well as σǫ, ση, σν, ρǫη, ρνǫ, and ρνη. This vector of parameters is indicated by θ. The primary
focus of the analysis is to compare the estimates of the time cost parameters, δ1 and δ2 to
the implied psychological cost derived from the parameter estimates in equation 8.
5 Estimation
The individual’s budget set is non-convex and intractable due to the tax function, FSP
beneﬁt function, and WIC eligibility cutoﬀ, making it diﬃcult to derive a closed-form labor
supply function or to use stepwise-linear techniques. Instead, we compartmentalize hours of
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where j ∈ {1,2,3,4} represents the hours of work choices {0,25,40,55}.
The probabilities in the log-likelihood equation above are computed using simulated
methods. A large number of draws (D total draws) are taken from the joint distribution
of the error terms in the psychological cost, leisure preference, and wage equations. The
15Observed hours are assigned to each bin by creating a range between bins 2, 3, and 4 that spans half
the distance to the next bin. This procedure is common in estimating structural models, for example, Keane
and Moﬃtt (1998) consider 3 hours choices: 0, 20, 40.






1 I(hid = hi,P1id = P1i,P2id = P2i) (12)
where d indicates a simulation draw for η, ǫ, and ν. The log-likelihood is evaluated given a
vector of parameter values, θ, and then an optimization routine is used to update θ in order
to improve the log-likelihood value. We use a simplex method rather than standard quasi-
Newton or conjugate gradient methods because the non-convexity of the budget set makes
these more standard methods less reliable. Once the solver converges, a new starting value
for θ is chosen and the estimation is performed again. This is done many times in an eﬀort
to eliminate local maximum values in the log-likelihood function. Although this does not
guarantee that a global maximum will be found, the robustness of the parameter estimates
to diﬀerent initial parameter values and the fact that the estimates are economically sensible
suggest that the estimation procedure is reliable. The results presented in Section 6 were
computed using 3000 simulation draws.
The simulated log-likelihood parameter estimates are asymptotically unbiased as the
number of simulation draws grows large. The standard errors are computed as the inverse
of the outer-product of the simulated scores. This procedure requires calculating the matrix
of contribution to the gradient, G(θ), but does not require computation of the full Hessian.
Calculating the Hessian is computationally diﬃcult because the derivatives of the likelihood
function must be found numerically.16 The matrix of contribution to the gradient is an N
x J matrix where N is the number of observations and J is the dimension of the vector of
16The Hessian matrix is often computed as part of the estimation procedure. However, this is not the
case when the optimization relies primarily on a simplex method. Because the simplex method does not
rely on derivatives of the log-likelihood function, these derivatives must be computed numerically once the
estimation procedure is completed.





and are calculated using the ﬁnite diﬀerence method.
The variance-covariance matrix is computed as the inverse of the outer-product of G(ˆ θ):







We apply the procedure outlined in Section 5 to compute estimates of the structural param-
eters from the model developed in Section 2. The estimates for the psychological costs and
leisure preference equations are given in Table 5, while the estimates of the time requirements
and other utility parameter estimates are shown in Table 6.
6.1 Parameter Estimates
The estimates from Table 5 show that the psychological costs of participating in a food-
assistance program are higher on average for those in metro areas and for those in the West
(relative to the Midwest). Psychological costs are lower on average for black women. The
indicator for AFDC participation is negative and quite large in magnitude. This implies
that the additional psychological cost of participating in a food-assistance program is quite
low for an individual who is already participating in a cash-assistance program, which is
consistent with our identifying assumption. The state-level participation rate in AFDC
is estimated to be negative but statistically insigniﬁcant. A better measure of the social
acceptability of welfare participation could result in this factor having a more signiﬁcant
role in the estimation.
19Table 5 also reports the parameter estimates for the leisure preference equation. The
leisure preference parameter, Γ, is bounded between 0 and 1 which means estimates that are
seemingly small could still be quite important. Again, the AFDC participation estimate is
very important; the large magnitude implies that AFDC participants have a much higher
preference for leisure. Women of prime working age (25 to 50) have signiﬁcantly lower
preference for leisure than younger and older women. Women with more education also have
a lower preference for leisure.
Table 6 shows the estimates for δ1, the time requirement of WIC, and δ2, the time require-
ment associated with FSP. These estimates imply that receiving beneﬁts and maintaining
eligibility for FSP requires about 0.54 hours per week. The estimated time cost associated
with obtaining beneﬁts through WIC is higher: approximately 3.14 hours per week. Receipt
of beneﬁts through WIC involves doctors visits, nutritional education, and more restrictions
on redeeming beneﬁts, which explains the greater time requirement.
In order to express the psychological cost parameter estimates in dollar terms we calcu-
late the level of additional consumption that would be needed to exactly oﬀset the change
in utility implied by each psychological cost parameter. This is reported in Table 7. This
conversion to 1997 dollars is performed at the mean consumption, leisure and leisure pref-
erence values. The standard errors are converted from utility terms into dollars using this
same method. The average predicted weekly psychological costs associated with participa-
tion for this population is approximately $18.92. Restricting the sample to those who are
not participating in AFDC the average predicted psychological cost is $27.55. The second
column of Table 7 reports the same parameter estimates converted into dollars using the av-
erage consumption, leisure, and leisure preference for those who are welfare eligible. In this
sub-population, preference for leisure is higher, consumption is lower, and leisure is higher.
Again restricted the sample to those who are not participating in AFDC, the average pre-
dicted psychological cost is $24.74 for those who are WIC eligible and $20.87 for those who
are FSP eligible.
20When time costs are also converted into dollars, it is clear that the psychological costs of
FSP participation are much larger than the time costs. The 0.54 hours per week of FSP time
costs is equivalent to $3.90 per week of consumption. For WIC, the time costs are equivalent
to $21.58 per week which is similar in magnitude to the psychological costs of participation.
For women who are eligible for these programs, the consumption equivalent of WIC time
costs is $19.10.
We ﬁnd that psychological costs are a substantial component of the utility cost of food-
assistance program participation and that they have an important inﬂuence on an individ-
ual’s decision to participate or not. This implies that there are important potential eﬀects
in terms of increased participation from policies that reduce the psychological costs asso-
ciated with welfare participation – such as increasing the level of transfer payments in the
income tax system – relative to policies that streamline the beneﬁts process. Our ﬁndings
indicate that policies that increase the negative stereotypes surrounding program usage –
both for traditional welfare programs or for other social insurance programs – will result in
substantial psychological costs for participants and serve as a barrier to participation.
6.2 Discussion of Identifying Assumptions
The estimated decomposition of the utility cost of welfare participation depends on the
assumptions of our structural model. One important assumption is that information costs
can be ignored. We assume that the household head is aware of both welfare programs
and maximizes utility by choosing hours of work and whether or not to participate in food-
assistance programs. We argue that this is a reasonable assumption, primarily based on the
ﬁnding that much of the movement in participation rates cannot be explained by information
costs. In particular, Currie (2003) ﬁnds that the participation rates in WIC vary dramatically
by child’s age: the take-up rate for eligible families with an infant (i.e., a child under age
one) is 73 percent, but drops to 38 percent for eligible families with children between ages
21one and ﬁve. This drop in participation rate as the child ages is not coincidental, but mirrors
a dramatic drop in the value of WIC beneﬁts once a child turns one year of age due to the
phasing out of infant formula. Low WIC participation rates among families with children
over age one is due to the drop in the value of beneﬁts rather than information costs.
Because of the panel nature of the SIPP, it is possible to observe subsequent WIC par-
ticipation decisions of households that have an infant in 1997. Of those households with an
infant that participated in WIC in 1997, only 50 percent continued to participate during
1998 (when the child was age 1), and only 44 percent continued to participate during 1999
(when the child was age 2). Thus, the drop in participation rates by these households cannot
be due to a lack of information about the program. Rather, it is likely due to the sharp
drop in beneﬁts as the child ages (see Table 1). This ﬁnding provides additional empirical
support for our assumption that lack of information is not a barrier to participation.
If women in our sample are unaware of government-provided food assistance, than our
estimate of psychological costs includes lack of information. However, if individuals know
that assistance is available, but do not participate because learning the details of a speciﬁc
program is too costly, then information costs are absorbed in the time cost estimates. We
believe the latter is more justiﬁable given the long history of these two programs (i.e., both
began in the early 1970s) and because we limit our sample to female household heads. Given
that our estimated time costs are relatively small, this potential bias does not aﬀect the
paper’s main conclusions. While Daponte, Sanders, and Taylor (1999) ﬁnd some evidence
that information increases participation rates in FSP among low-income families, they also
ﬁnd evidence that acquisition of information is endogenous: households with higher expected
beneﬁts are more likely to acquire information about the program. They ﬁnd that FSP
participation rates rose sharply with the amount of qualiﬁed beneﬁts, increasing from 40
percent for the ﬁrst quartile to 93 percent for the fourth quartile. This is consistent with
individuals basing participation decisions on a cost-beneﬁt calculation and with the cost
of acquiring information as a program-speciﬁc cost and inconsistent with non-participants
22lacking of information about the availability of in-kind assistance.
The key assumption that provides identiﬁcation of the utility cost decomposition is that
there are no additional psychological costs from participation in a second food-assistance
program. We cannot test this assumption directly, but we can present evidence consistent
with this assumption. In particular, the drop in WIC beneﬁts at the qualifying child’s
ﬁrst birthday and again at the child’s ﬁfth birthday provide exogenous variation in the WIC
participation rate. This drop in beneﬁts is associated with a large drop in WIC participation
at age 1 and age 5 as previously discussed. Our identifying assumption implies that FSP
participation should also drop at these points because the marginal cost of FSP participation
is much lower for a WIC program participant, even though child age has no direct aﬀect on
FSP beneﬁts. As shown in Figure 1, FSP participation rates are aﬀected by child age. There
are discontinuities in FSP participation at the points where WIC beneﬁts are discontinuously
reduced.
The results from Keane and Moﬃtt (1998) provide additional support for our identifying
assumption. These authors use a structural model of AFDC and FSP welfare program par-
ticipation to determine whether the utility cost of participation is additive in the number of
programs. They ﬁnd that the estimated utility cost of participating in an additional welfare
program is small, or that utility costs are nearly non-additive. Their estimates support our
assumption that the psychological cost of welfare participation increases only in the exten-
sive margin, not the intensive margin (Keane and Moﬃtt (1998) do not consider the WIC
program which we estimate has relatively large time costs). In addition to Keane and Mof-
ﬁtt, other studies have found that participating in one program increases the probability of
participating in a second program and that individuals who participate in multiple programs
tend to leave all of them simultaneously, even when they are still eligible for beneﬁts (Grobe,
Weber, and Davis 2008; Brauner 1999).
If the identifying assumption does not hold, any program speciﬁc psychological costs
would bias the program speciﬁc time costs upward. The estimated time cost for the FSP
23is small suggesting that any marginal psychological costs for this program would be small
implying that our assumption holds at least approximately. The larger time costs for WIC
could indicate that there are important additional psychological costs imposed with WIC
participation, which is unlikely given the higher income threshold and target population of
primarily children. It may simply reﬂect the higher time cost required by the WIC program.
If one ﬁnds the identifying assumption untenable, another way to interpret the results is that
we are separately estimating the ﬁxed and marginal costs of welfare participation, where the
margin is in terms of additional programs. Given the two programs considered, we are
interpreting the ﬁxed component as psychological costs and the marginal as time costs.
Comparing the participation decision predicted by the estimation to actual participation
behavior is one way to evaluate the accuracy of our model and empirical speciﬁcation. Table
8 shows actual versus predicted participation behavior for FSP and WIC. The predicted par-
ticipation choice for each individual is calculated as the participation combination that yields
the highest utility given a value of zero for all error terms. If the observable characteristics in
the empirical speciﬁcation perfectly predicted participation, there would be no weight in the
oﬀ-diagonal elements of the tables. For FSP, the observable characteristics are able to cor-
rectly predict participation for about 87 percent of individuals; these characteristics correctly
predict WIC participation for about 95 percent of individuals. The substantial fraction of
incorrect predictions is not surprising given the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in
determining welfare participation.
7 Stigma as a Screening Mechanism
While the primary goal has been to empirically separate time costs from the psychological
costs associated with welfare participation, these individual-level costs do not necessarily
imply a commensurate reduction in social welfare. The utility costs of welfare participation
may be a useful way of distinguishing potential welfare recipients who are of high-ability
24from those of low-ability if both have low income. Nichols and Zechhauser (1982) note
that “ordeals” required for participation, such as “demeaning qualiﬁcation tests and tedious
administrative procedures,” may serve a sorting role (p. 376). Namely, because welfare
beneﬁts are available to all individuals with low income, some high-ability individuals may
choose to earn less in order to qualify. If the government only wants to provide income
transfers to those individuals with low ability, without a selection mechanism it will be
unable to distinguish high- and low-ability individuals who both report low income. Hence,
in the context of asymmetric information (i.e. the government only observes income, not
ability), welfare stigma may act as a screening, or self-targeting, mechanism and enable the
government to achieve its policy goals (Currie and Gahvari 2008; Stuber and Schlesinger
2006).
The secondary goal of this paper is to determine whether our empirical results are sup-
portive of psychological costs acting as an eﬀective screening mechanism. Below we outline
a simple model to show the conditions under which the utility costs associated with welfare
participation could be used as a screening mechanism. In this model agents are either high-
ability type (θH) who earn wage wH or low-ability type (θL) who earn wL. If the agent is fully
employed, low-ability types earn IL and high-ability types earn IH. However, high-ability
types can also choose to work less and earn IL. Hence, conditional on IL, the agent could be
either low- or high-ability.17 In our model, the government wants to provide welfare beneﬁts
to low-ability agents but not to high-ability agents. However, it only observes income, not
ability (or wage), and thus cannot determine whether agents who earn IL are low-ability or
high-ability without a screening mechanism.
This model could alternatively be expressed in terms of γ, the utility parameter that
indicates the preference for leisure. In this equivalent set-up agents either have a strong
17For simplicity, we only allow high-ability types to have two possible levels of income, IH and IL. However,
because we are thinking of the distribution of type conditional on income, the assumption of the model that
only high-ability types have a “choice” over income is not restrictive because one can always construct
another income level IL′ < IL that low ability types earn if they are only partially employed.
25preference for leisure, γH, or have a low preference for leisure, γL. High-ability agents who
work less and earn IL do so because they have a higher preference for leisure, while low-
ability types who earn IL have a low preference for leisure.18 Therefore, conditional on IL,
the agents are either γH (corresponding to θH) types who thus actually have the potential to
earn IH, or γL (corresponding to θL) types who earn IL by being “fully employed.” Again,
we assume that the government wants to provide welfare beneﬁts to low income agents with
γL and not to low income agents with γH.
In this context, introducing welfare stigma to the model may help the government achieve
its policy goal. Welfare stigma imposes a cost, φ, on agents who choose to participate in
the welfare program. An agent who participates in the welfare program receives beneﬁts
which increase utility by B. Therefore, an agent chooses to participate if B > φ(θ), where
θ represents the agent’s type, either θH or θL. If welfare stigma imposes a higher utility
cost on high-ability (or high-leisure types) conditional on income, then it will discourage
these agents from participating in the welfare program (i.e. psychological cost has increasing
diﬀerences in type). In this model, if φ(θH) > B > φ(θL) then introducing welfare stigma
allows the government to oﬀer welfare beneﬁts to all agents with income IL and yet only
provide welfare beneﬁts to the low-ability agents. All high-ability agents choose to earn IH
and do not receive welfare beneﬁts because the utility cost from welfare stigma is greater
than the utility gain from the welfare beneﬁts. Thus, introduction of welfare stigma would
have social beneﬁt. However, if φ is uncorrelated with type, or has decreasing diﬀerences
in type, then welfare stigma is not a useful means of achieving the government’s goal and
simply imposes a cost on the agents.
While the above model is a simplistic characterization of the potential screening role
of psychological costs, the implication is that the cost that stigma imposes on society is
less than the aggregated individual-level costs if stigma is an eﬀective screening mechanism.
The incidence of time costs are consistent with the screening mechanism desired by the
18Otherwise, these low-types would have earned an income level less than IL.
26government because time costs are higher for individuals with higher wages. Our model
allows us to examine the relationship between psychological costs and preference for leisure.
To evaluate whether stigma is an eﬀective screening mechanism, we calculate the cor-
relation between predicted psychological costs and preference for leisure across individuals.
This correlation is -0.7934 implying that those with a lower preference for leisure have higher
psychological costs on average. This is strong evidence against stigma serving as an eﬀective
screening mechanism and implies that individual-level psychological costs are not oﬀset by a
social beneﬁt due to their screening role. There is also considerable unobserved heterogeneity
in the psychological cost and preference for leisure equations and the estimated correlation
of the error terms is positive (ρǫη, is estimated to be 0.05 as reported in Table 6). However,
the overwhelming negative correlation of the observables outweighs the positive correlation
of the unobservables.
8 Conclusion
This paper diﬀers from the previous studies that seek to estimate the utility costs of welfare
participation because it distinguishes psychological costs from time costs. We develop a
model of labor supply and participation in multiple welfare programs that we estimate using
data on participation in FSP and WIC by female household heads in the SIPP. We estimate
the model using a simulated maximum likelihood procedure. To identify psychological costs
and time costs, we assume that the psychological cost does not increase in the number of
programs in which participants are enrolled and that time costs are program speciﬁc.
We ﬁnd that the time requirement associated with participation in FSP is about 0.5
hours a week or approximately 2 hours a month. The estimated time requirement associated
with WIC is much higher: as much as 3.1 hours a week (about 12.5 hours a month). This
diﬀerence in time requirement is consistent with the more time-intensive activities associated
with WIC, including doctor visits, nutritional education, and more restrictions on WIC
27beneﬁt redemption.
We ﬁnd the implied dollar equivalent of the average level of psychological costs associated
with participation to be large, about $19 per week. Separately identifying the components
of the utility cost associated with participation in welfare is important to welfare reform and
policies designed to more eﬀectively reach the target population. In addition, our results
suggest that psychological costs are not an eﬀective way to prevent able workers from using
government assistance as a substitute for working. Therefore, psychological costs incurred
by individuals reﬂect a direct loss in social welfare.
One limitation of this study is the imputation of eligibility. In the sample of low-income
households interviewed by Daponte, Sanders, and Taylor (1999), only 51 percent of house-
holds that met the gross income test of 130 percent of poverty also met the asset and net
income tests. While we address this concern by imposing both the gross income test and an
approximation of the net income as well as a monetary asset test, we are unable to enforce
eligibility conditions relating to vehicular assets. In addition, the role of information as a
barrier to participation is not captured our model. While we justify this assumption by
citing empirical support for the endogeneity of information acquisition due to the strong
link between value of beneﬁts and participation status, further work is needed to assess the
inﬂuence of lack of information relative to time and psychological costs.
The assumption that psychological costs are non-additive may also require further review.
Research from sociology and psychology suggests that the psychological costs associated
with participation, or stigma, can be decomposed into self-inﬂicted and peer-inﬂicted costs,
or identity and treatment stigma (Yaniv, 1997; Stuber and Schlesinger, 2006). Treatment
stigma is the negative treatment by friends, family, or program administrators, while identity
stigma is negative self-characterization by the participant or potential participant. In this
framework, treatment stigma could plausibly increase with the number of programs as the
participant is exposed to additional peer groups or social audiences (e.g. grocery stores,
medical clinics, childcare centers, etc.). Future work could attempt to estimate these diﬀerent
28sources of psychological costs by incorporating additional programs into the model, such as
by looking at participation in programs either that diﬀer in where beneﬁts are used or that
are used in the same environment, but diﬀer in transparency of usage.
The estimated model could be used to assess the social welfare implications of diﬀerent
transfer policies, such as policies that reduce the visibility of program usage. Such a policy
could include tightening welfare program eligibility requirements while expanding the EITC
program in a way that preserves existing expenditures levels. Additionally, future work could
evaluate the adoption of the EBT system by applying the model in this paper to more recent
data from the 2004 SIPP to assess the eﬀect of this policy change on psychological costs.
Given the large estimates of the psychological costs of welfare participation obtained in this
paper, policies that reduce the visibility of participation will likely increase social welfare
substantially.
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Source: The data is described in Section 3.2 and is a sample of female household heads from the 1996
SIPP. The two vertical lines represent points where WIC beneﬁts are reduced. The data points shown are
the FSP participation rates for each 4-month child age group.
33Table 1: Value of WIC Beneﬁts
Monthly Value of
Family Member Food Items ($1997)
Infant: 0 to 3 months $97.66
Infant: 4 to 12 months $105.41
Child: 1 to 5 years $31.26
Mother: Pregnant or Breast-feeding $33.59
Sources: Food items from www.fns.usda.wic/beneﬁtsandservices/foodpkgtable.htm
Prices: www.giantfood.com and prices deﬂated using CPI-U: www.bls.ogv/cpi
34Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (Weighted)
Demographic Characteristics Mean St. Error Minimum Maximum
Age 40.6 0.2 18 64
White 65.1% 0.7% 0 1
Black 23.0% 0.6% 0 1
Hispanic 7.8% 0.4% 0 1
Asian or Native Amer. 3.9% 0.3% 0 1
Years of Schooling 13.5 0.04 0 20
Master’s Degree or higher 7.7% 0.4% 0 1
Bachelor’s Degree 15.8% 0.5% 0 1
Associate’s Degree 12.1% 0.5% 0 1
Some College 21.6% 0.6% 0 1
High School Graduate 28.0% 0.6% 0 1
High School Dropout 8.6% 0.4% 0 1
Junior High Dropout 6.3% 0.3% 0 1
Live in Urban Area 82.9% 0.5% 0 1
South 34.2% 0.7% 0 1
Family Size 1.9 0.2 1 13
Any Children in Family (under age 18) 39.3% 0.7% 0 1
Number of Children (under age 18) 0.7 0.02 0 10
Child under age 5 (WIC eligible) 13.8% 0.5% 0 1
Teen in Family 16.0% 0.5% 0 1
Elderly Dependent 3.4% 0.2% 0 1
Labor Force Participation and Income Mean St. Error Minimum Maximum
Non-Labor Income (weekly) $138 $4 $0 $11,258
Positive Non-Labor Income 82.6% 0.6% 0 1
Liquid Assets $3760 $200 $0 $275,279
Liquid Assets (Median) $232
Positive Hours 76.6% 0.6% 0 1
Weekly Hours of Work 32.0 0.3 0 154
35Table 3: Welfare Participation and Beneﬁts
Program Participation Mean St. Error Min Max
WIC 5.7% 0.3% 0 1
FSP 15.7% 0.5% 0 1
WIC and FSP 4.0% 0.3% 0 1
WIC (with a Child under age 5) 38.3% 1.8% 0 1
WIC (with an Infant) 66.5% 4.2% 0 1
WIC (with a Child age 1 to 5) 36.0% 1.9% 0 1
Monthly Beneﬁt Mean St. Error Min Max
Maximum FSP Beneﬁts $208 $108 $121 $1,180
Value of WIC Beneﬁts (Child < 5 years old) $53 $37 $31 $242
State Take-up Rate in AFDC (1996)* 34.4% 8.3% 13.0% 63.0%
*Caseload as a fraction of individuals in poverty by state in 1996. Computed using Census and
Department of Health and Human Services data.
36Table 4: Hourly Wage - Heckman Selection Correction
Ln Wage Positive Hours
Characteristics Coeﬃcient St. Error Coeﬃcient St. Error
Age 0.050 (0.004)** 0.057 (0.012)**
Age - Squared -0.001 (0.000)** -0.001 (0.000)**
Master’s or higher 0.560 (0.029)** 0.779 ( 0.103)**
Bachelor’s Degree 0.422 (0.022)** 0.370 (0.069)**
Associate’s Degree 0.219 (0.023)** 0.412 (0.073)**
Some College 0.146 (0.019)** 0.192 (0.057)**
High School Dropout -0.130 (0.031)** -0.473 (0.068)**
Junior High Dropout -0.184 (0.043)** -0.783 (0.078)**
Black -0.056 (0.017)** -0.154 (0.050)**
Hispanic -0.102 (0.027)** -0.055 (0.076)
Asian 0.046 (0.051) 0.072 (0.170)
Native American -0.051 (0.045) -0.111 (0.128)
South -0.094 (0.014)** 0.013 (0.043)
Urban 0.156 (0.018)** 0.135 (0.053)*
Presence of Children under Age 5 -0.504 (0.061)**
Non-Labor Income (weekly) -0.001 (0.000)**




** Signiﬁcant at 1%; * Signiﬁcant at 5%
37Table 5: Psychological Cost and Leisure Preference Estimates
Psychological Leisure
Variable Cost Preference
years of schooling 0.036 -0.0007**
(0.028) (0.0001)




AFDC participant -23.409** 0.1633**
(1.686) (0.0028)
age under 25 2.052** -0.0018
(0.670) (0.0037)
age 25-29 -0.109** -0.0669**
(0.458) (0.0020)
age 30-34 0.281* -0.0409**
(0.124) (0.0036)
age 35-39 0.288 -0.0519**
(0.528) (0.0044)
age 40-44 0.460 -0.0543**
(0.700) (0.0044)
age 45-49 -0.084 -0.0542**
(1.708) (0.0059)








Native American -0.010 0.0072
(1.968) (0.0053)
south region -0.054 0.0091**
(0.335) (0.0013)
west region 1.165** 0.0174**
(0.125) (0.0028)
northeast region 0.546 0.0281**
(0.617) (0.0019)




** Signiﬁcant at 1%; * Signiﬁcant at 5%
38Table 6: Time Requirements and Utility Parameter Estimates
WIC Time Requirement (δ1) 3.14**
(0.02)
















** Signiﬁcant at 1%; * Signiﬁcant at 5%
39Table 7: Psychological Cost Coeﬃcient Estimates in Dollars
Full Welfare
Variable Sample Eligible
years of schooling 0.144 0.158
(0.152) (0.166)












Native American -0.040 -0.044
(8.039) (8.814)
south region -0.216 -0.237
(1.348) (1.479)
west region 4.676** 5.132**
(0.503) (0.552)
northeast region 2.189 2.402
(2.477) (2.717)
AFDC Rate by State -6.112 -6.711
(5.893) (6.471)
** Signiﬁcant at 1%; * Signiﬁcant at 5%
40Table 8: FSP and WIC Predictions
FSP Participation, Actual and Predicted Percentages
Predicted Predicted
Non-Participant Participant Total
Actual Non-Participant 76.30 7.20 83.50
Actual Participant 6.06 10.43 16.50
Total 82.37 17.63 100
WIC Participation, Actual and Predicted Percentages
Predicted Predicted
Non-Participant Participant Total
Actual Non-Participant 91.97 2.22 94.19
Actual Participant 2.62 3.19 5.81
Total 94.59 5.41 100
41